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This paper presents a closed form solution for time-consistent taxation and public spending
in a dynamic game between government and median voter. Extending Meltzer and Richard’s
static analysis of government size the paper offers a theory of growth of government. At
low stages of economic development the median voter, identified as a relatively poor worker,
prefers to have no or only small redistributive taxation in order to foster savings. Through
this channel he expects improvements of his labor productivity and wage. At higher stages
of development, however, when capital is relatively abundant and prospects of further labor
productivity gains through capital accumulation are smaller, the incentive to tax and redis-
tribute income rises. Yet, in line with previous work on growth and infrastructure spending
the median voter prefers a constant share of productive public spending at all times. Hence,
government growth is solely driven by an expanding welfare state.
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1. Introduction
Alan Meltzer and Scott Richard’s (1981) paper “A Rational Theory of the Size of Gov-
ernment” constitutes one of the seminal and most heavily cited publications in the literature
about the redistributional state and its development over time. Meltzer and Richard show
that a government striving for re-election will use a positive tax on income to finance lump
sum transfers if the median voter earns less than average income. Defining the share of income
redistributed as a measure of the size of government they show that government size increases
with decreasing income of the median voter. Lower income of the median voter may originate
from an increasing spread of the franchise as observed in many countries over the last centuries
so that their model can explain expansion of the government sector during that period of time.
Because results are derived in a general equilibrium setting with optimizing agents Meltzer
and Richard refer to their work as a ”a rational theory of the size of government with contrast
to older, more ad-hoc explanations of the same phenomenon like Wagner’s Law and Baumol’s
cost disease (Wagner, 1893, Baumol, 1967).
Although Meltzer and Richard frequently refer to an expansion of the government sector
over time, their theory is in fact static. They conclude (p. 925): “[I]t seems necessary to embed
the analysis in a model with saving, capital accumulation, and public goods and to explore the
effect of permitting relative shares to change as income changes. From an analysis of a growing
economy, we can expect to develop a rational theory of the growth of government to complement
our analysis of the government’s size.”
This paper offers such an extension towards a theory of government growth. It considers
an economy populated by investors in capital, workers with varying productivity (i.e. labor
income), and a government that uses a general income tax in order to finance productive
government spending and lump sum transfers. It explains why in such an environment the
size of government is increasing with decreasing labor income of the median voter (which
confirms Meltzer and Richard’s result) and why the government share of GDP increases as the
economy grows (which constitutes the new result).
The main difficulty in developing a theory of government growth i.e. of time-dependent fiscal
policy is the problem of time-inconsistency (Chamley, 1986). A convincing theory of govern-
ment growth should therefore consider policy strategies that do not depend on credibility but
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on the state of the economy. Unfortunately, closed form solutions under such time-consistent
Markovian strategies are hard to find. The solution derived in this paper requires logarithmic
utility, inelastic labor supply, and a society divided in capital owners and workers. Numeri-
cal solutions, however, show robustness of the result with respect to general iso-elastic utility
functions.
The article is built upon Judd (1985) who has investigated open-loop redistributive taxation
in a neoclassical worker-capitalists economy and, in particular, upon Kemp et al. (1993) who
have studied time-consistent taxation in this framework. It extends the literature by distin-
guishing between productive public spending and redistribution (i.e. the provision of a welfare
state) and by deriving adjustment dynamics for time-consistent taxation and redistribution.1
The empirical literature provides ample evidence that the share of government in GDP has
grown significantly in all western countries over the last century (see e.g. Borcherding, 1985).
In particular the results presented in Boix (2001) support the model developed in this present
paper by showing that both income per capita and income inequality have an independent
influence on the size of government (See also Husted and Kenny, 1997). Yet, some qualifying
remarks are in order. First, there are also quite a few studies who were unable to find a
positive correlation between income inequality and redistribution, most notably Perotti (1996).
Section 5 offers an explanation – built upon cross-country intersections of policy functions –
for how both positive and negative correlations can be observed within the same politico-
economic model. Second, government size has stagnated or even decreased over the last two
decades for some fully developed countries. While the model explains a stagnating expansion
of government as completed convergence towards the steady-state it fails to explain its secular
decrease. The appropriate period that one should have in mind when reading this paper are
therefore the three decades after World War II where both income per capita and government
share of GDP grew at high rates in most parts of the western world.
1Politico-economic aspects of taxation are also investigated by Romer (1975), and Roberts (1977), and in
an endogenous growth framework among others by Bertola (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and
Tabellini (1994), and Krusell et al. (1997). Recently, Hassler et al. (2003) have also provided analytical results
for Markov equilibria of voting on redistributive taxation. Their article, however, considers survival of the
welfare state, i.e. conditions for it’s long-run existence, while the present work focusses on growth of the welfare
state, i.e. it’s development over time.
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2. A Politico-Economic Model of Government Growth
We consider an economy whose output (y) is produced by competitive firms using labor
supplied by workers and capital supplied by capitalists. A worker i ∈ [0, 1] has productivity
i, where the continuous distribution of productivities (or skills) is normalized so that average
productivity is unity;
∫ 1
0 idi = 1. The average wage rate is denoted by w. Workers supply
one unit of labor and earn an income according to their productivity level of iw. Production
is subject to a Cobb-Douglas function with capital share α and general factor productivity A
implying an interest rate r = αAkα−1 and an average wage w = (1− α)Akα, where k denotes
the capital stock.
A democratically elected government taxes income at a rate τ and uses revenues for redis-
tribution and productive spending. Its choice variables are the tax rate and the share of tax
revenue spend productively, denoted by q. The tax rate is used as a measure of government
size while the share of national income redistributed, given by (1− q)τ , is used as a measure
of the size of the welfare state. The worker with productivity m is identified as the median
voter. His preferences determine fiscal policy.
All citizens derive utility from consumption. While workers by definition consume all income,
capitalists face the usual problem of allocating consumption optimally over time. An average
capitalists consuming ck derives utility
∫∞
0 u(ck)e
−ρtdt. He shares with all other citizens a
time preference rate ρ and an isoelastic utility function u(x) = x1−θ/(1− θ) with special case
u(x) = ln(x) for θ = 1. His budget constraint is given by
k˙ = (1− τ)rk − δk − ck, (1)
where δ is the rate of depreciation. The solution of the utility maximization problem is
characterized by the Ramsey rule c˙k/ck = [r(1 − τ) − δ − ρ]/θ, i.e. the consumption strategy
ck(k) fulfils
ck
′(k) =
c˙
k˙
=
[r(1− τ)− δ − ρ]ck
θ[r(1− τ)k − δk − ck] . (2)
The part of tax revenues used for productive spending, g = qτy, enhances general factor
productivity. As in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) these enhancements are subject to con-
gestion so that total factor productivity is obtained as A = B(g/y)β . These congestion effects
prevent that government expenditure generates perpetual growth although it is an essential
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input in production. Fiscal policy independent productivity B, could be used to introduce
exogenous technological progress. Because this, however, would not add further insight into
the mechanics behind government growth, we consider B to be constant over time. The term
β determines effectivity of government spending. Rewrite production as y = (Bgβkα)1/(1+β)
to obtain the output elasticity of government expenditure as β/(1 + β). This expression will
play a major role in the subsequent discussion.
Tax revenues not spent productively are used to redistribute income uniformly from capi-
talists to workers. Hence a worker i has net income of
ci = (1− τ)(1− α)wi + τ(1− q)y = [(1− τ)(1− α)i + τ(1− q)]B(qτ)βkα . (3)
Inserting the interest rate the equation of motion can be rewritten as
k˙ = (1− τ)αB(qτ)βkα − δk − ck . (4)
Because infrastructure spending is an essential input in production, capitalists and workers
irrespective of their productivity want the government to play a role in the economy (i.e.
τ > 0). But only workers with sufficiently low productivity want to have a welfare state (i.e.
they prefer q < 1). Which policy is actually executed is determined by the median voter whose
intertemporal utility is maximized by the government subject to (2) – (4) through Markovian
fiscal policy strategies, τ(k), q(k). Summarizing, the government maximizes the current value
Hamiltonian
H =
1
1− θ
{
[(1− τ)(1− α)m + (1− q)τ ]B(qτ)βkα
}1−θ
+ λ
[
(1− τ)αB(qτ)βkα − δk − ck(k)
]
, (5)
where m denotes the median voter’s productivity.
The solution of this Stackelberg game with the government as leader and the average cap-
italist as follower is derived in the Appendix. Equilibrium fiscal policy strategies fulfill the
following set of equations.
qτ =
β
1 + β
, (6)
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τ˙ =
(1− τ)(1− α)m + τ − β1+β
θ [(1− (1− α)m]
{
α2Akα−1
(1 + β) [1− (1− α)m] − δ − ρ−
∂ck
∂k
− θαk˙
k
}
, (7)
k˙ = (1− τ)αAkα − δk − ck(k) , (8)
0 = lim
t→∞u
′(cm) [1− (1− α)m] /α · ke−ρt . (9)
Inspection of (6) immediately yields a first result.
Theorem 2.1. The GDP share of productive public services, g/y = qτ , is time-invariantly
and independently from characteristics of the median voter determined by the production elas-
ticity of infrastructure.
The result generalizes Barro’s (1990) “natural efficiency condition” that the optimal mar-
ginal return on productive expenditure equals unity (∂y/∂g = β/(1 + β)y/g = 1) in two
respects. First, it is derived as a dynamic Markovian strategy where fiscal policy instruments
are not restricted to be constant over time. Second, it holds although individuals differ in pro-
ductivity and although infrastructure expenditure is not the only objective of government. The
possibility that income distribution policy changes over time, however, prevents to conclude a
constant size of government from the natural efficiency condition.
Government size τ is generally not constant in (7) as long as the economy develops, i.e. as
long k grows. A solution trajectory of (7) – (9) and (2) provides an equilibrium tax strategy
τ(k) together with an equilibrium consumption strategy ck(k). Because the partial derivative
c′k in (7) has generally no analytical representation we proceed in two steps.
2 The next section
considers the special case of logarithmic utility for which a simple closed form solution for ck(k)
exists. Section 4 then investigates welfare state dynamics for the general iso-elastic utility case
using numerical solutions of the model.
3. Government Growth: Analytical Solution
This section presents government dynamics for the analytically solvable case of logarithmic
utility, i.e. θ = 1. Inspect (2) to verify that then the consumption strategy ck = ρk is the
solution of the capitalists’ problem not only at the steady-state but at any conceivable state
2In order to avoid confusion I refer to the solution of the differential game as equilibrium, defined by equilibrium
Stackelberg strategies for government and citizens, whereas a state of constant k (and therewith constant
fiscal policy) is referred as steady-state. Hence an equilibrium is obtained at any adjustment path towards the
steady-state fulfilling (7)-(9) as well as in the steady-state itself.
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of the economy. This behavior originates from the fact that for logarithmic utility income
and substitution effects of expected future fiscal policy changes exactly balance each other so
that current net investment, k˙ = (1 − τ)rk − (δ + ρ)k, depends only on current fiscal policy
and the current state of the economy. This phenomenon is in detail derived and explained
by Lansing (1999) and Krusell (2002). It is therefore worthwhile to know whether the results
on the mechanics of government growth that will be derived in this section are not simply an
artefact of the special properties of logarithmic utility. Using numerical techniques the next
section confirms qualitatively similar government dynamics for the case of general iso-elastic
utility functions.
The closed form solution for ck transforms (7) and (8) into an easily tractable two-dimensional
system of ordinary differential equations.
τ˙ =
(1− τ)(1− α)m + τ − β1+β
[(1− (1− α)m]2
{
α2
(1 + β)
kα−1 −
(
δ + 2ρ+ α
k˙
k
)
[1− (1− α)m]
}
, (10)
k˙ = (1− τ)αAkα − (δ + ρ)k . (11)
From (6) follows that the equilibrium tax strategy is bounded from below, τ ≥ β/(1 + β)
because the q is per construction less than or equal to one. Hence, the numerator of the first
term in (10) is always positive and the non-trivial steady-state of (10) and (11) is unique and
obtained as follows.
k∗(m) =
{
(δ + 2ρ) [1− (1− α)m] (1 + β)
α2A
} 1
α−1
, (12)
τ∗(m) = 1− (δ + ρ)α(1 + β) [1− (1− α)m] (δ + 2ρ) . (13)
Boundedness of τ from below also implies that there exists a corner solution without a welfare
state at q = 1. It is assumed when the median voter is very productive so that (13) is smaller
than τ¯∗ ≡ β/(1 + β) and q would be larger than one according to (6).3 Summarizing, the
actual steady-state fiscal policy is given by
τ∗ = max {τ¯∗ , τ∗(m)} . (14)
3If the median voter is extremely rich the denominator in (13) gets negative suggesting a clearly suboptimal tax
rate τ(m) larger than one. Of course, for this degenerate case the corner solution τ¯
∗ also applies. In subsequent
analyses I neglect this from the empirical viewpoint irrelevant case, i.e. I focus on m < 1/(1− α).
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At the corner, steady-state capital is obtained from (11) independently from the median
voter’s productivity as k¯∗ = [(δ + ρ)(1 + β)/(αA)]1/(α−1). In order to compare corner and
interior solution it is useful to focus on the empirically relevant case of a left-skewed income
distribution, i.e. a median voter who earns less than (or at most the same as) average labor
income, m ≤ 1. Now note that k∗(m) is increasing in m and compare k∗(1) with k¯∗ to verify
that steady-state capital and hence total income is lower if a welfare state exists. This is the
familiar result of distortionary capital taxation: a welfare state requires higher tax rates which
drives down the capitalists’ incentive to invest.
Interestingly, the median voter – although per construction himself not an investor – is not
necessarily interested in a welfare state. His indirect benefits from a high capital stock through
high labor productivity and work income may overcompensate his direct benefits from income
redistribution. A sufficient condition for a welfare state can be obtained by checking whether
τ∗(m) is larger than τ¯ for a median voter with mean income. This yields the condition
ρ/(δ + ρ) > β. Only if time-preference is sufficiently high and infrastructure productivity is
sufficiently low a citizen with mean income wants to have a welfare state at the steady-state.
More generally, verify that the derivative ∂τ∗(m)/∂m in (13) is negative which proves the
following result.
Theorem 3.1. The possibility that a welfare state exists and, if it exists, the size of the
welfare state are decreasing in productivity (i.e. income) of the median voter.
Figure 1. Median Voter Income and Size of Welfare State
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6  (1− q)*τ
ε
 m
ε
 m
τ
Parameters: α = 0.36, δ = 0.05, ρ = 0.02, B = 1. Solid lines: β = 0.1, dashed lines: β = 0.2
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Figure 1 shows preferred tax rates (government size) on the left panel and GDP shares redis-
tributed (welfare state size) on the right for parameters frequently used in calibration studies of
the neoclassical growth model and alternative productivity of the median voter. One sees that
any median voter poorer than the mean wants to have a welfare state. Empirically observable
magnitudes for government size are obtained for m between 0.75 and 1. Interestingly, for
higher productivity of infrastructure – an increase of β/(1 + β) from 0.09 (solid lines) to 0.16
(dashed lines) – the median voter wants not only higher tax rates but also a smaller welfare
state. Higher productivity of infrastructure leads to raising tax rates in order to provide more
productive government services. This in turn raises productivity of all workers inclusive the
median voter and reduces the wish for high taxes for the purpose of redistribution.
Comparative steady-state analysis replicates Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) results with the
same effects of rising income inequality and a spread of the franchise on the size of government
and welfare state. Yet, the incentives that limit the size of government are slightly different.
The median voter knows that higher tax rates reduce savings and investment and affect (1) his
labor income through lower productivity on a less capital-intensively equipped working place
and (2) total income in the economy that could be possibly redistributed. For that reason,
even the poorest person with m = 0 and no labor income at all would not support a tax rate
of one hundred percent but “only” a τ∗ of 0.74.
While the results at the steady-state confirm Meltzer and Richard’ s findings on size of
government, the dynamic formulation of the present model allows to investigate growth of
the welfare state which has not been possible within the earlier static framework. Recall that
τ ≥ τ¯∗ to obtain the positively sloped τ˙ = 0–isocline.
τ = 1− 1
[1− (1− α)m] (1 + β) +
(δ + ρ)(1− α) + ρ
α2A
· k1−α .
Insert (11) in (10) to see that τ˙ > 0 above the curve and τ˙ < 0 below. The k˙ = 0–isocline,
τ = 1− δ + ρ
αA
· k1−α ,
is negatively sloped with k˙ < 0 above the curve and k˙ > 0 below. Figure 2 shows the resulting
phase diagram. The steady-state is identified as a saddle-point.
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Figure 2. Government Growth: Phase Diagram
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From the possible policy trajectories in Figure 2 only the stable manifold does not violate
the first order conditions. All other paths cause the median worker’s consumption to jump to
zero in finite time either because of missing private capital (k = 0) or of missing infrastructure
(τ = 0). Hence, government dynamics are uniquely determined. The combined direction of
motion points to the northwest for k < k∗ so that the stable manifold is upward sloping.
Tax rates raise together with capital and hence together with GDP of the economy. From
(6) follows that the income share of productive government spending stays constant over time
implying that welfare expenditure rises superproportionally with income.
Theorem 3.2. If a welfare state exists, its size increases as the economy grows.
For an intuition of the paper’s main result, which holds irrespective of median voter’s income,
consider a developing economy far below its steady-state. At such a position of small capital
stock a unit of net investment leads to pronounced improvements of labor productivity and
current and future work income. High taxes for the purpose of redistribution would suppress
savings and investment and largely reduce these future consumption possibilities. In other
words, income redistribution causes comparatively large opportunity costs in form of low
economic growth. Consequently, it is in the interest of the median voter that the government
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fosters savings and enhances growth with low tax rates and a small welfare state. At a stage
of high development, however, the capital stock is close to its steady-state level and gains
in labor productivity resulting from yet more investment are comparatively small. With not
much growth to loose the opportunity costs of redistribution are comparatively small and the
incentive to afford a large welfare state is large.4
Increasing inequality (measured by a reduction of the median voters productivity m rela-
tive to the mean) raises the government’s incentive to redistribute. It shifts the τ˙ = 0–curve
upwards and leaves the k˙ = 0–curve unchanged. This shifts the policy function τ(k) up-
wards implying a larger government and larger welfare state at the steady-state and along the
adjustment path.
4. Government Growth: General Case
This paper has argued that the welfare state grows because opportunity costs of redistri-
bution are higher at lower stages of development. The mechanism is based on the feature of
decreasing marginal productivity and should be independent from the peculiarities of loga-
rithmic utility. Nevertheless, in order to verify this claim we consider numerical solutions for
alternative elasticities of marginal utility. From the Ramsey rule,
c˙k =
[(1− τ)αAkα−1 − δ − ρ]ck
θ
, (15)
evaluated at the steady-state follows (1−τ)αAkα−δk = ρk and hence with (8) the the familiar
consumption rule c(k) = ρk. With contrast to the log-utility case, however, the rule applies
at the steady-state only.
Dynamic behavior off the steady-state is somewhat more complicated to assess because of
the partial derivative c′k in (7). We solve this problem by applying the backward integration
technique described in Brunner and Strulik (2002). Using the initial guess c′k = ρ the dynamic
system (7), (8) and (13) is integrated backwards starting close to the steady-state. The
derivative c′k is simultaneously obtained according to (2). The backward integration technique
employs the fact that any trajectory converges towards the stable manifold as time proceeds.
Starting close to the steady-state, i.e. already close to the stable manifold, this procedure
4Because the argument is based on adjustment dynamics – driven by transitionally higher savings rates – it is
robust against an extension of the model with TFP–driven growth.
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leads to very accurate approximations of the consumption function c(k) and the equilibrium
tax strategy τ(k).
Equilibrium tax rates for parameter values from Figure 1 and alternative values for the
marginal elasticity of utility are shown in Figure 3. With re-reverted time the trajectories
start at k = 2 and end close to their respective steady-state value k∗. While tax policy is
quite sensitive to changes of θ, the main result that τ(k) is positively sloped remains valid for
values of θ which are predominantly used in calibration of neoclassical growth models. Size of
government and welfare state increase as the economy grows.
Figure 3. Policy Function for Alternative θ
2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
θ=.75
θ=1
θ=2.5
 k
τ
Parameters as in Figure 1 and m = 0.8, θ ∈ [0.75, 2.5].
Figure 3 also reveals that – in deviation to the standard tax-augmented neoclassical growth
model – steady-state capital stock and hence total income depend on the marginal elasticity
of utility. As in the standard model higher tax rates reduce the incentive to save and there-
with long-run capital stock. Tax rates, however, are no longer fixed or set independently but
determined by strategic interaction. The government takes into account the possible reaction
of investors on their tax policy. The actual tax policy is adjusted to the magnitude of in-
tertemporal income and substitution effects that a change of taxes, i.e. net interest rates, may
provoke.
At the steady-state the incentive to tax is relatively small if the government faces citizens
with strong preference to smooth consumption over time, characterized by a high value of θ.
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In that case rising taxes would reduce investment considerably. For small values of θ, however,
the substitution effect is small and may be even dominated by the income effect (for θ < 1).
Under these circumstances capitalists react to a further income loss through higher taxation
by investing more in subsequent periods and the incentive to tax is relatively strong.
Far off the steady-state the opposite mechanism is at work. When capital is relatively
scarce and interest rates are high, individuals with low θ are inclined to save much more
than under steady-state conditions. In order to not distort the implied high growth potential
the government taxes relatively little. If the government faces citizens with high θ, on the
other hand, it knows that their savings propensity at low stages of development does not
much deviate from steady-state behavior. Because not much growth potential is lost, the
government has an incentive to levy relatively high taxes right from the beginning.
In other words, size and growth of the welfare state are interrelated. Populated by individuals
with low preference for consumption smoothing the economy and its government size converge
relatively rapidly towards their steady-state. For example, initial growth (c˙m/cm) at k = 2 is
5.2 percent for θ = 1 and 1.8 percent for θ = 2.5. For the same reason of a large intertemporal
substitution effect, however, the high–growth economy approaches a lower steady-state income
level: it’s government is more inclined to afford a higher welfare state. The fact that size and
growth of government depend on the state of the economy means that policy functions τ(k)
for governments in alternative economies may intersect each other. The next section will use
this feature to offer an explanation for the sometimes weak and counter-intuitive empirical
findings on the correlation between income distribution and government size.
5. Inequality and Government Size: A Theoretical Cross–Country Comparison
The correlation between inequality and government size has been extensively investigated
empirically. Interestingly, some studies (among others Perotti, 1996, and Benabou, 1996) are
unable to support the theoretical argument that more unequal societies should have a larger
government size. On the other hand, other studies find strong support (see e.g. Meltzer and
Richard, 1983, Husted and Kenny, 1997, and Milanovic, 2000), and it is probably best to say
that the problem is not yet completely resolved empirically. The theoretical literature has
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reacted to the mixed and inconclusive empirical results by extending the basic model so that
it can explain also the opposite outcome, i.e. government size decreasing with inequality.5
The present paper offers an alternative explanation for the puzzling empirical findings. It is
based on cross-country comparative dynamics and maintains a generally positive correlation
between income inequality and government size within countries. Consider two countries
distinguished by alternative levels of income inequality and one or more other parameter value
so that their policy functions τ(k) intersect. Assume, for example, that for income levels
smaller than at the point of intersection the more unequal country has a larger government
(measured by τ). Then, by construction, the opposite holds true after the intersection point:
the less unequal country affords the larger government.
The last section has applied to varying preference parameters (θ) to show that policy func-
tions may indeed intersect. For a cross–country comparison, however, it is more appealing
to take preferences as being identical across countries and consider differences of general pro-
ductivity which can be more convincingly justified by empirical evidence.6 As an example
we consider one country characterized by lower general productivity and lower inequality
(m = 0.8, B = 1) than the other country (m = 0.6, B = 1.3). All other country characteris-
tics are identical.7 Here, we do not try to investigate why one country is more unequal or more
productive than the other or whether these phenomena are correlated. We focus solely on the
problem why under these circumstances researchers comparing both countries can arrive at
different conclusions about inequality and government size.
Figure 4 shows the policy functions for both countries beginning far off the steady- state, i.e.
in a period of reconstruction (for example, after a war). For better comparison with empirical
cross-country studies (which usually control for GDP) the policy function τ(k) is mapped into
the tax-income space (using y = Akα). Both countries start at y = 0.5, which is a little less
than half the steady-state value of the less productive country. At that point both countries
5See e.g. Saint-Paul and Verdier (1996), Benabou (2000), Grossmann (2003), Dalgaard et al. (2003). In partic-
ular the latter paper is related to the present work because it uses also cross–country productivity differences
to explain the inequality-redistribution puzzle. It considers a model without transitional dynamics where more
productive countries have a more equal distribution of income. In contrast, the current paper establishes no gen-
eral productivity-inequality link and explains the puzzle by intersecting policy functions, i.e. as a phenomenon
of transitional dynamics.
6See, for example, Islam (1995) and Caselli et al. (1996) for the importance country-specific fixed effects.
7We consider the case of log-utility and α = 0.36, ρ = 0.02, δ = 0.05, β = 0.2.
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refrain from distribution. Private capital and infrastructure are such scarce that the benefits
from high productivity growth over-compensate the benefits from redistribution.
Figure 4. Inequality and Government Size:
A Cross–Country Comparison of Adjustment Dynamics
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
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τ
[ε
m
=0.8, B=1]
[ε
m
=0.6, B=1.3]
Other parameters: Parameters: α = 0.36, δ = 0.05, ρ =
0.02, β = 0.2.
At income level y = 0.55 a welfare-state become achievable in the high-productivity country
populated by the poorer median voter, and τ starts to grow together with income. For a period
of time lasting until the point of intersection taxes are higher in the country populated by the
more unequal society. We observe a positive partial correlation between income inequality and
government size.
As income reaches a level around 0.7 a welfare state becomes affordable in the less pro-
ductive country populated by the more equal society. In this country, however, productivity
growth is relatively slow (because of low TFP) and the opportunity costs of redistribution
are comparatively small. For that reason the government has a relatively high incentive to
redistribute income in favor of the median voter at any given income level above the lower
bound τ¯∗. As a consequence of lower opportunity costs of redistribution the slope of the policy
function is steeper than in the high productivity country.8 After the point of intersection we
observe a negative partial correlation between income inequality and government size.
8Generally speaking, in phase diagram analysis an increase in general productivity B (and hence A) reduces
the slope of both the k˙ = 0–curve and the τ˙ = 0– curve leading to an equilibrium at higher k and a flatter
policy function τ(k).
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Summarizing, the explanation offered for the mixed findings on the inequality–redistribution
correlation is based on omitted variables, in particular general factor productivity. The phase
diagram analysis has shown that controlling for TFP higher inequality shifts the stable mani-
fold upwards and leads to higher taxes at the steady-state and everywhere along the adjustment
path. Hence, controlling for TFP, the implied correlation between inequality and government
size is unambiguously positive.
6. Final Remarks
The main focus of Meltzer and Richard’s work has been the development of government
size over the last centuries where an increasing spread of the franchise was observed. While
this origin of government growth is still available in the current paper the focus has been on
government growth under constant wealth of the median voter. The finding that along the
adjustment path the government sector expands although wealth of the median voter remains
constant is compatible with Li, Squire and Zou’s (1998) observation of an insignificant time
trend of inequality for most of the countries contained Deininger and Squire’s (1998) dataset
during the period 1947-1994; a period characterized by a large expansion of the government
sector in many developed countries.
Government growth has been explained as a phenomenon of transitional dynamics, for
example, in a period of reconstruction after war or after a structural reform. For that purpose
the paper has employed a neoclassical production function. One possible extension could be
an explanation of government growth in a model of endogenous growth. For an obvious reason,
however, existing median voter models of endogenous growth (e.g. Bertola, 1993, Alesina and
Rodrik, 1994) are inappropriate for such an extension. These linear models show no adjustment
dynamics while growth of the government sector – although observable over a long period in
history – is certainly a temporary phenomenon.
While the government sector continues to grow in many economies, Borcherding et al. (2002)
observe falling government consumption over the last decades for the U.S. and some other
highly developed European countries. A shrinking government (and in particular a shrinking
welfare state) could be explained as a consequence of increasing fiscal policy competition
between national authorities. An explanation within the framework presented in this paper
could extend the analysis to a two-country model where governments maximize utility of
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their median voters. Using the world capital stock as state variable these government’s play
Markovian Stackelberg strategies with their median voters and Nash strategies with each
other. It is easily imaginable that competition over the world capital stock will lead to less
redistributive taxation.
Finally, it is interesting to compare the model’s predictions with actual fiscal policy during
the period’s of reconstruction in West and East Germany, respectively. At different times
(after World War II and after German Unification) both region’s suffered from massive loss of
private and public capital. West Germany’s historical path of government growth is explainable
within the model provided. The government first refrained from high income redistribution
and established a large welfare state at later stages of economic development. With contrast,
policy in East Germany with its immediate adoption of West Germany’s fiscal system of high
taxes and redistribution does not fit the model of maximizing the median voters welfare. Thus,
arguments from less formal reasoning that East Germany’s fiscal policy has not been in the
interest of the East German voter (Sinn, 2000) find support by the theory of government
growth offered in this paper.
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Appendix
Let u(cm(k, τ(k))) denote the median voters instantaneous utility function. The solution for
problem (5) has to fulfill the tranversality condition (9) and the following first order conditions.
u′ {(1− q)− (1− α)m + β [(1− τ)(1− α)m/τ + (1− q)]}+ λ [(1− τ)αβ/τ − α] = 0 (A.1)
u′ {−τ + β [(1− τ)(1− α)m + (1− q)τ ] /q}+ λ(1− τ)αβ/q = 0 (A.2)
u′ [(1− τ)(1− α)m + (1− q)τ ]B(qτ)βαkα−1
+ λ
[
(1− τ)αB(qτ)βαkα−1 − δ − ∂ck
∂k
]
= λρ− λ˙ (A.3)
Multiplying (A.2) by q/τ and subtracting the result from (A.1) yields
λ = u′ [1− (1− α)m] /α =⇒ λ˙ = u′′cm′k˙ [1− (1− α)m] /α . (A.4)
Inserting (A.4) in (A.1) provides (6) in the main text.
Inserting λ and λ˙ from (4), and u′′/u′ = −θ/cm from the iso-elastic utility assumption into
(A.3) one obtains
−θ cm
′
cm
k˙ =
α2
1− (1− α)m
cm
k
+ (1− τ)αB(qτ)βαkα−1 − δ − ρ− ∂ck
∂k
. (A.5)
And inserting the derivative
cm(k, τ(k))′ = α
cm
k
+ [1− (1− α)m] ∂τ
∂k
Akα
and ∂τ/∂k = τ˙ /k˙ in (A.5) one obtains (7) in the main text.
Finally insert (6) in (4) and substitute the definition of A – now to be found a constant – in
order to obtain (8). Equation (9) originates from insertion of (A.4) into the usual transversality
condition.
17
References
Alesina, A. and Rodrik, D., 1994, Distributive politics and economic growth, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 109, 465-49.
Barro, R.J., 1990, Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth, Journal
of Political Economy 98, S.103-S.125.
Barro, R.J. and X. Sala-i-Martin, 1992, Public Finance in Models of Economic Growth, Review
of Economic Studies 59, 645-661.
Baumol, W., 1967, Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis,
American Economic Review 57, 415-426.
Benabou, R., 1996, Inequality and Growth, NBER Working Paper 5658.
Benabou, R., 2000, Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract, American
Economic Review 90(1), 96-129.
Bertola, G, 1993, Factor Shares and Savings in Endogenous Growth, American Economic
Review 83, 1184-1198.
Borcherding, Th.E., 1985, The Causes of Government Expenditure Growth: A Survey of the
U.S. Evidence, Journal of Public Economics 28, 359-382.
Borcherding, Th.E., J.S. Ferris, and A. Garzoni, 2002, Growth and the Real Size of Government
Since 1970, in: The Kluwer Handbook of Public Finance, ed. J. Backhaus and R.E. Wagner,
Kluwer Academic Press (Hingham, Ma), forthcoming.
Boix, C., 2001, Democracy, Development and the Public Sector, American Journal of Political
Science 45, 1-17.
Brunner, M. and H. Strulik, 2002, Solution of Perfect Foresight Saddlepoint Problems: A
Simple Method and Applications, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 26, 737-753.
Caselli, F., G. Esquivel, and F. Lefort, 1996, Reopening the Convergence Debate: A New Look
at Cross-Country Growth Empirics, Journal of Economic Growth 1, 363-389.
Chamley, C., 1986, Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite
Lives, Econometrica 54, 607-622.
Dalgaard, C.-J., H. Hansen, and T. Larsen, 2003, Income Skewness, Redistribution and
Growth: A Reconciliation, EPRU Working Paper 2003-14, University of Copenhagen.
Deininger, K. and L. Squire, 1998, New Ways of Looking at Old Issues: Inequality and Growth,
Journal of Devlopment Economics 57, 259-287.
Grossmann, V., 2003, Income Inequality, Voting over the Size of Public Consumption, and
Growth, European Journal of Political Economy 19, 265-287.
Hassler, J., J.V. Rodriguez Mora, K. Storesletten, and F. Zilibotti, 2003, The Survival of the
Welfare State, American Economic Review 93(1), 87-112.
Husted, T.A. and L.W. Kenny, 1997, The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on
the Size of Government, Journal of Political Economy 105(1), 54-82.
Islam, N., 1995, Growth empirics: a panel data approach, Quarterly Jounal of Economics 110,
1127-1170.
Judd, K.L., 1985, Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model, Journal of
Public Economics 28, 59-83.
18
Kemp, M.C., N. V. Long, and K. Shimomura, 1993, Cyclical and Noncyclical Redistributive
Taxation, International Economic Review 34, 415-429.
Krusell, P., V. Quadrini, and J.-V. R´ıos-Rull, 1997, Politico-Economic Equilibrium and Eco-
nomic Growth, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 21, 243-272.
Krusell, P., 2002, Time-Consistent Redistribution, European Economic Review 46, 755-769.
Lansing, K.J., 1999, Optimal Redistributive Capital Taxation in a Neoclassical Growth Model,
Journal of Public Economics 73, 423-453.
Li, H., L. Squire, and H. Zou, 1998, Explaining International and Intertemporal Variations in
Income Inequality, Economic Journal 108, 26-43.
Meltzer, A.H. and S.F. Richard, 1981, A Rational Theory of the Size of Government, Journal
of Political Economy 89, 914-97.
Meltzer, A.H. and S.F. Richard, 1983, Tests of a Rational Theory of the Size of Government,
Public Choice 41, 403-418.
Milanovic, B., 2000, The Median-Voter Hypothesis, Income Inequality and Income Redistri-
bution: An Empirical Test with the Required Data, European Journal of Political Economy
16, 367-410.
Perotti, R., 1996, Growth, Income Distribution and Democracy: What the Data Say, Journal
of Economic Growth 1, 149-187.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, 1994, Is Inequality Harmful for Growth, American Economic
Review, 84, 600-621.
Roberts, K.W.S., 1977, Voting over Income Tax Schedules, Journal of Public Economics 8,
329-340.
Romer, Th., 1975, Individual Welfare, Majority Votingm and the Properties of a Linear Income
Tax, Journal of Public Economics 4, 163-185.
Saint-Paul, G. and T. Verdier, 1996, Inequality, Redistribution and Growth: A Challenge to
the Conventional Political Approach, European Economic Review 40, 719-728.
Sinn, H.-W., 2000, Germany’s Economic Unification: An Assessment after Ten Years, Review
of International Economics 10, 113-128.
Wagner, A., 1893, Grundlegung der Politischen Oekonomie, Leipzig, 3rd edition.
19
